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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.

:
:

CHRISTOPHER BLAIN OSTLER,
Defendant/Respondent.

No. 20000287-SC
:

Priority 13

REPL Y BRIEF OF PETITIONER
UPON GRANT OF CERTIORARI REVIEW

This Court granted certiorari to review State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, 996 P.2d
1065, which vacated defendant's misdemeanor convictions based on his guilty pleas. See
State fs Opening Brief, Addendum A (opinion). In addition to the facts and legal argument
contained in the State's opening brief [hereafter State Br.], the State submits the
following points in reply to defendant's responsive brief [hereafter Def Br.].

REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE
AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
The issue raised on certiorari is a legal question and, therefore, the facts
surrounding defendant's offenses and pleas are largely irrelevant. See State Br. at 1-4.
However, because the facts contained in defendant's brief, see Def Br. at 2-6, are
incomplete and not fully marshaled, the State submits the following additional record
facts. See State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 3, 985 P.2d 911 (on certiorari review, the

Supreme Court applies the legal standard applicable to the court of appeals and views the
record facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling).
Before defendant entered his guilty pleas in this case, he already had considerable
knowledge of and experience with the Utah court system. See State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d
216, 217 (Utah 1991) (appellate court may consider presentence report and other record
documents when reviewing a plea). Beginning some ten years prior to his present
convictions, defendant was placed under the supervision of the juvenile court for various
delinquencies, including car theft (R. 56, 58). His court involvement continued into
adulthood, during which he was convicted of several minor misdemeanor offenses as well
as one felony offense (R. 57, 58). Approximately three weeks prior to his commission of
the present offenses, defendant was placed on probation by another judge for separate
misdemeanor convictions (R.59; R. 71: 2).
As explained to the arraignment court, the instant offenses (joyriding and assault)
arose out of an altercation with defendant's girlfriend, Heather Healey, who was pregnant
with his child (R. 3; R. 69: 2-5). On December 27, 1997, Heather and defendant got into
a fight while in her car (R. 3; R. 69: 3). Heather jumped out of the car to escape (R. 3).
Defendant drove off and did not return the vehicle; Heather called the police (id.; R. 69:
3-4). The investigating officer observed the "black eye and several [facial] marks"
Heather suffered as a result of defendant's assault (id).
Defendant admitted that he fought with Heather and took her car (R. 69: 3-5). He

2

claimed that the day after the fight, Heather told him she had reported the car stolen (R.
69: 3-4). Defendant denied "stealing" the car because he had been allowed to "borrow" it
on prior occasions (id.). But defendant admitted he did not return the car as requested;
instead, he told Heather that if she wanted it, she could "come and get it" (id.).
Apparently, the car was eventually recovered.1
According to defendant, Heather originally called the police because she was mad
at him and "the way she goes about getting me is putting me in jail because she feels
that's the only way she can hurt me" (R. 69: 4-5). Defendant said that when he called
Heather to have her drop the charges following his arrest, she said she was not pressing
the charges, the State was (R. 69: 5).
After defendant initially told the arraignment court that he "guessed" he was

1

Unlike felony theft of a motor vehicle which requires an intent to permanently .
deprive the owner of his or her vehicle, see UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-404 & -412 (1999),
misdemeanor unauthorized control of a motor vehicle (joyriding), the offense to which
defendant pled, only requires proof that a defendant exercised "unauthorized control over
a motor vehicle . . . not his own, without the consent of the owner . . . and with the intent
to temporarily deprive the owner... of possession of the motor vehicle." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 41-la-1314(1) (1998). It is not a defense to joyriding that the owner previously
consented to the defendant's control of the vehicle. See UTAH CODE ANN. §41-la1314(2) (1998).
Defendant's admissions to the trial court (R. 69: 3-5), together with the probable
cause statement attached to the Information (R. 2-4), formed a proper factual basis for the
guilty pleas. See Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217 (necessary basis for plea may be established
by colloquy and through record documents). The court of appeals' conclusion that the
pleas lacked a factual basis, see Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, ^14, and defendant's current
similar assertions, see Def. Br. at 5, are incorrect. This Court, however, need not resolve
the issue since the merits of the plea procedure are not before the Court. See Supreme
Court Order Granting and Limiting Certiorari Review (State Br., Addendum B).
3

guilty, the judge informed defendant that he did not want him to plead guilty to something
he did not do and asked why defendant was pleading guilty (R. 69: 2-3). Defendant told
the judge that he wanted to "get it done with. . . . I figure if I just come her[e] and plead
guilty and get it over with, I can then get on with my life. I try to straighten out" (R. 69:
2). The judge then directed defendant to explain what happened, which defendant did (R.
2-4; R. 69: 3-5). See discussion of facts, supra at 2-3. The judge asked whether
defendant had seen the court's tape-recorded explanation of rights, which defendant said
he had (R. 69: 2-5).2 After accepting defendant's guilty pleas, the court advised
defendant that he had only 30 days to move to withdraw the misdemeanor pleas (R. 69: 2
& 5).3
Defendant failed to appear for sentencing (R. 70: 2). He was arrested on a bench
2

The tape-recording explained the rights waived by the entry of a guilty plea as
specified by rule 1 l(e)(3)-(e)(8), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, but did not address
the elements or factual basis for the offenses, as required by rule 11(e)(4) (A) & -(B).
Compare Supplemental Record: Tape, with UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(e) (State Br.f Addendum
C). But see note 1, supra at 3 (the factual basis for the pleas was established by the
colloquy and Information). Even though the trial court referred to the tape before
accepting defendant's pleas, the court did not further question defendant concerning his
rights nor enter a finding on the record that the pleas were voluntary (R. 69: 2-5). See
requirements of UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(2); and Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217-18. But see
note 7, supra at 3 (despite defendant's discussion of the merits, the validity of the plea
procedure is not before the Court).
3

See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1999) (30-day limitation on the filing of
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea) (State Br., Addendum Q . In addition to the judge's
warning, the tape-recording of rights also advised defendant that entry of a guilty plea
waived his right to appeal and that he would only have 30 days from entry of the pleas to
move for their withdrawal (see Supplemental Record). See also Ostler, 2000 UT App 28,
f 8 (affirming that defendant was warned of the statutory 30-day limitation).
4

warrant and sentencing was re-set (id.). During the subsequent sentencing hearing held
on May 19, 1998, defendant admitted that what he had done was "wrong" but still
asserted that his girlfriend set him up because she was mad (R. 18; R. 71: 3-5).
Defendant was sentenced to jail (R. 17; R. 71: 5). Approximately two weeks later,
defendant sent a letter to the court in which he apologized for his actions but challenged
his sentence as being "outside the matrix" and stated that he did not have counsel when he
was sentenced (R. 19).4
A few days later, on June 8, 1998, defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal (R. 20).
The same day, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R. 21-22).
On June 15, 1998, the untimely motion was properly denied (R. 72). See Ostler, 2000 UT
App f 8 (recognizing the untimeliness of defendant's motion to withdraw and affirming
the trial court's ruling that it had no jurisdiction to consider it). Following the denial of

4

Contrary to the court of appeals' conclusion and defendant's assertions, see
Ostler, 2000 UT App 28,fflfl1 & 24; Def. Br. at 7, the Sixth Amendment does not
mandate appointment of counsel in all misdemeanor cases, only those in which the
defendant is indigent and incarceration is imposed. See Nicols v. United States, 511 U.S.
738, 743 (1994); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); Orem City v. Bergstrom,
1999 UT App 350, f 8, 992 P.2d 991 (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37
(1972)). In this case, defendant was sentenced to jail (R. 71: 5); however, it appears he
was not indigent Defendant lived in his parents' home and earned $500.00 per week as a
subcontractor for Mountain States Fence (R. 62). Only after he was sentenced and
incarcerated on the present offenses, did defendant claim that he was indigent and entitled
to the appointment of counsel (R. 32). Counsel was then appointed for purposes of
appeal (R. 40). However, no court has ever found that defendant was indigent at the time
of his pleas. But again, this Court need not resolve the issue. See note I, supra at 3.
5

the motion to withdraw, defendant filed a second notice of appeal on June 24, 1998 (R.
26-27).5
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANTS CONTENTION THAT HE MAY DIRECTLY APPEAL
HIS GUILTY PLEAS WITHOUT FILING A TIMELY MOTION TO
WITHDRAW IS WITHOUT LEGAL SUPPORT; LACKING A TIMELY
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, DEFENDANT MUST NOW SEEK
COLLATERAL REVIEW
Defendant contends that the court of appeals properly considered the validity of his
guilty pleas because defendant appealed from the "guilty pleas themselves," and not from
the denial of his untimely motion to withdraw. See Def. Br. at 6-10 & 23-24. But see
note 5, below. According to defendant, "[b]ecause an appeal from a plea itself does not
involve the review of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, such a review must be made
under a plain error or exceptional circumstances review" {Def. Br. at 10). Utah law does
not support defendant's argument.
5

Defendant now claims that he appealed directly from his guilty pleas, not from
the denial of his motion to withdraw. See Def. Br. at 6-10 & 23-24. Utah law does not
permit such a direct appeal. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311-12 (Utah 1987)
(requiring a defendant to file a motion to withdraw before challenging a guilty plea on
appeal). But even if it did, defendant does not explain his second notice of appeal, which
would have been both untimely and unnecessary if defendant had been appealing from his
pleas. See UTAH R. APP. P. 4(a) (notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days from entry
of judgment). In contrast, the second notice of appeal was timely and was required if
defendant was appealing from the denial of his motion to withdraw. See UTAH R. APP. P.
4(b) (notice of appeal filed prior to disposition of post-conviction motion is premature;
second notice of appeal must be filed following disposition of motion). Significantly,
while defendant acknowledges only his first notice of appeal, see Def Br. at 5, the court
of appeals properly referred only to the second notice filed subsequent to the denial of the
motion to withdraw. See Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, %5.
6

For over a decade, Utah procedure has required a defendant to file a motion to
withdraw as a predicate to direct appellate review of the validity of a guilty plea. See
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311-12 (Utah 1987). Prior to 1989, however, no time
limit existed for the filing of a motion to withdraw. See id:, State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d
993, 994 n.l (Utah 1993). Failure to file a motion to withdraw was, therefore, "curable"
on appeal: the appellate court could simply remand to permit the trial court an opportunity
to consider the merits. See Gibbons, id. (remanding to allow the defendant an
opportunity to file a motion to withdraw).
In 1989, Utah law changed. Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 994 n.l. The Utah Legislature
amended UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 to require that any motion to withdraw be filed
"within 30 days after the entry of the plea." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1999).6
The 1989 amendment was not simply a "procedural change" regulating the timing of a
motion to withdraw, but a substantive change which "extinguished" a defendant's right to
challenge his plea. Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995. Failure to file a motion to withdraw, thus,
ceased to be an issue of preservation. Cf. Id.; Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312. Instead,

6

Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (1982) ("[a] plea of not guilty may be
withdrawn at any time prior to conviction[; a] plea of guilty or no contest may be
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of the court"), with UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-13-6 (1989) (2) (1989) ("[a] plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn
only upon good cause shown with leave of the court[; a] request to withdraw a plea of
guilty or no contest is made by motion, and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of
the plea"). The current version of section 77-13-6 retains the 1989 amended language
and is reproduced in Addendum C of the State's opening brief.
7

failure to comply with the 30-day time restriction was recognized as a jurisdictional bar to
the trial court's review. See Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, 1fl[7-8 {citing with approval State v.
Price, 837 P.2d 578, 583 (Utah App. 1992)). See also State Br. at 5-12. As a result,
appellate review of the validity of guilty pleas entered after April 24, 1989, is precluded
if: (1) the defendant is informed of the 30-day limitation at the time of his guilty plea, and
(2) he thereafter fails to file a timely filed motion to withdraw. See State v. Johnson, 856
P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1993) (without a timely motion to withdraw, defendant is
precluded from challenging his pleas on appeal); Price, id. See also State Br. at 7-16.
But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(3) (30-day limitation does not preclude collateral
review).7
Defendant attempts to avoid section 77-13-6(2)(b)'s jurisdictional limitation by
baldly asserting he is not appealing from his untimely motion to withdraw but from the
"pleas themselves."8 See Def. Br. at 6-10 & 23-24. Defendant, however, cites no
7

A defendant may also retain the right to challenge an illegal sentence. See UTAH
R. CRIM. P. 22(e) (a court may correct an illegal sentence "at any time"). See also State v.
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995) (appellate court may correct illegal sentence for
the first time on appeal, but rule 22 does not permit the appellate court to review the
substance of a conviction); State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah App. 1991) (trial
court does not lose "subject matter jurisdiction" until illegal sentence has been corrected);
and see State v. Tyree, 2000 UT App 350, f 10 (rejecting defendant's argument that rule
22(a) regulating the time for sentencing was jurisdictional, and distinguishing between
directive nature of rule 22(a) and jurisdictional nature of section 77-13-6).
8

Defendant also re-argues his claim that Price should be overruled. See Def. Br.
at 18-20 n.4. The court of appeals rejected this argument, Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, f7,
and this Court denied defendant's cross-petition raising the same issue. See State Br.,
Addendum B. Defendant now seeks supplemental briefing but presents no reason for this
8

controlling authority which permits him to do so. See note 5, supra at <5. Instead,
defendant inappropriately relies on federal law, which neither recognizes a motion to
withdraw nor has a statutory restriction comparable to section 77-13-6. See FED. R.
CRIM.

P. 11(c)(6) & (h) (under federal procedure, right to appeal is not automatically

waived by entry of a guilty plea but may be "bargained" away through plea agreement;
on appeal, harmless errors will be disregarded).9 Moreover, several of the federal cases
cited by defendant are distinguishable in that they involved pleas in capital cases or
appeals from jury verdicts. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241 (1969) (applying
"plain error" analysis in death penalty case); United States v. Caudill, 915 F.2d 294, 296
(7th Cir. 1990) (utilizing "manifest injustice" standard to review unpreserved sufficiency
claim arising out of jury trial); United States v. Stamas, 443 F.2d 860, 861 (1st Cir.) (in
pre-Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) case, using "plain error" analysis to

Court to reverse its previous order. Under these circumstances, the State maintains that
the 30-day limitation is jurisdictional but does not otherwise respond to defendant's
argument.
9

Defendant ignores the significant differences between Utah and federal
procedural rules and inappropriately cites to McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459
(1969), without acknowledging that it has been superseded by federal rule 11(h)'s
adoption of a harmless error rule. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, Advisory Committee Notes,
1983 Amendment. See also United States v. Gomez-Cuevas, 917 F.2d 1521, 1525 & n.2
(10th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that McCarthy's strict compliance test made sense when
rule 11 was a "relatively short and general pronouncement," but that rule 1 Ts "ten-fold
increase in size" renders a harmless error analysis more appropriate: "[o]ne who has pled
guilty and done so voluntarily, understandingly, and with knowledge of the consequences
of his plea . . . has evinced a desire to waive technicalities, to come to terms with the legal
system, and to admit to fault") (citations and quotation marks omitted).
9

reach ineffective counsel claim arising out of jury trial), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 851
(1971). And the remainder of defendant's federal cases are supportive of the State's
position. See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996) (a court has no
authority to circumvent rules to consider merits of time-barred claims); United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1,15 (1985) (limiting "plain error" analysis in appeals from jury
verdicts to "only particularly egregious errors") (citation and quotation marks omitted).
See also State Br. at 6, 8-9 &1L[0
Additionally, defendant cites to Utah cases where the merits were reached on
appeal but (1) the guilty pleas were entered prior to section 77-13-6's amendment, (2) if
entered post-amendment, the defendant was not advised of the 30-day limitation, or (3) a
timely motion to withdraw was filed but denied. Under any of these circumstances,

Defendant's reliance on other states' case law, see Def. Br. at 9, is similarly
unavailing. Compare, e.g., State v. Heatwolfe, 423 S.E.2d 735,158-160 (N.C. 1992)
(reviewing capital and non-capital pleas in death penalty case), cert, denied, 520 U.S.
1122 (1997) {Def. Br. at 9), with Stephens v. Koenig, Inc., 458 S.E.2d 233, 324 (N.C.
App. 1995) (appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider appeal where trial court had no
jurisdiction to consider the matter) (State Br. at 10); compare Small v. South Norwalk
Saving Bank, 535 A.2d 1292, 1296 (Conn. 1988) (appellate court may use "plain error"
to review an untimely motion for new trial) (Def. Br. at 16), with Cadle v. Ginsburg, 721
A.2d 1246, 1255 n.5 (Conn. App. 1998) (appellate court cannot review merits of claim
where trial court was jurisdictionally barred from considering it), cert, denied, 724 A.2d
1125 (Conn. 1999) (State Br. at 10 & 12); and compare Robinson v. State, 373 So.2d
898, 902 (Fla. 1979) (interpreting Florida statute limiting appellate review as permitting
review of the plea procedure itself, but recognizing that an appeal should never be used as
a substitute for a timely motion to withdraw) (Def. Br. at 9), with Maddox v. State, 760
So.2d 89, 95-96 (Fla. 2000) (interpreting 1996 substantially amended Florida statue
regulating appeals, and characterizing Robinson as a sentencing case). See also State Br.
at 8 & 10-12.
10

jurisdiction is not at issue. See, e.g., Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217 (merits considered where
defendant properly moved to withdraw his pre-amendment plea and then appealed
denial); Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311-12 (pre-1989 amendment plea appealed but appeal
remanded to allow defendant to file the requisite motion to withdraw); State v. Pharris,
798 P.2d 772, 774 (Utah App. 1990) (relying on the pre-amendment cases of Gibbons and
State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah App. 1989), merits of additional unpreserved
claims considered in timely appeal from denial of timely motion to withdraw postamendment plea), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990); Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1334
(merits reached where defendant appealed from denial of a motion to withdraw a pre1989 amendment plea).
Contrary to defendant's assertion, see Def. Br. at 8, Ostler does not distinguish
between a direct appeal of a guilty plea and an appeal from the denial of a motion to
withdraw. Instead, the court of appeals recognized that (1) defendant had been warned of
the 30-day limitation, (2) defendant failed to timely file a motion to withdraw, (3) the trial
court properly denied the untimely motion, and (4) defendant, thereafter, appealed.11
Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, Iff 5-8. The court of appeals respected the jurisdictional limit
placed on the trial court's consideration of the merits, but refused to apply the same
limitation to itself. Id. at f 8. Ostler's improper course was not premised on the
distinction defendant now argues concerning the nature of his appeal, but on the court of

11

See discussion, note 5, supra at 6.
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appeals' over-reading of State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313 (Utah 1998). See Ostler, id.
Marvin's guilty pleas were entered two months after the 1989 amendment of
section 77-13-6. Marvin, 964 P.2d at 314. Under Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311-12, Marvin
should have moved to withdraw his plea before appealing. However, it appears that he
was not advised of the new 30-day limitation on filing a motion to withdraw.12 Therefore,
as in pre-amendment cases, Marvin's failure to file the motion was an issue of
preservation, not jurisdiction. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(f); Price, 837 P.2d at 582 (failure
to inform defendant of 30-day limitation precludes jurisdictional bar). As a result, while
the Court could have followed the course it did in Gibbons and remand to permit Marvin
an opportunity to move to withdraw his plea, it chose not to do so. Instead, given the
case's convoluted and extensive procedural history, see Marvin, 964 P.2d at 314-15, the
Court chose to dispose of defendant's frivolous claims by reviewing them pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), md State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah
1981). See Marvin, id. See also State Br. at 15-16. As a consequence, Marvin is a
routine case. Accord State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346 (citing Marvin for
routine preservation standard). It does not support Ostler's departure from normal
procedural and jurisdictional rules.
Furthermore, defendant's attempts to distinguish between a trial court's lack of

12

Review of the State's appellate briefs filed in Marvin, as well as this Court's
decision, provides no indication that Marvin was ever warned of the 30-day limitation.
12

subject matter jurisdiction and its authority to act, see Def. Br. at 17-23, are, in this
context, semantic. Whether using the term "subject matter jurisdiction," see State Br. at
6-7, "jurisdiction," see Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, f 8, or "authority," see Def. Br. at 22-23,
the applicable legal analysis is the same. When a court lacks jurisdiction, it lacks the
authority to "inquire into facts, apply the law, make decisions, and declare judgment."
Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edition 1990). See also Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 425-26
(recognizing that a court may not use its inherent or supervisory powers to circumvent
rules and consider the merits of an untimely filed motion);13 United States v. Kember, 648
F.2d 1354, 1358-59 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (equating "jurisdiction" with a court's power to act)
{both cited Def Br. at 20-22). And when a trial court lacks the jurisdiction or authority to
reach the merits of a claim, the appellate court is similarly limited. See State Br. at 5-16.
Defendant's reliance on case law governing motions for new trial is also
misplaced. See Def Br. at 16-17. A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is an attempt to
reverse a defendant's previous chosen course, that is, his decision to forego further
challenge and settle the case. In contrast, a motion for new trial, while seeking to undo

13

Defendant cites extensively to Justice Ginsberg's concurring opinion in
Carlisle, see Def Br, at 20-22, but fails to acknowledge her recognition that subject
matter jurisdiction is the authority of a court to consider a claim. See Carlisle, 517 U.S.
at 434-35. While Justice Ginsberg was reluctant to characterize an untimely motion for
acquittal as a question of subject matter jurisdiction, she characterized this as her own
"highlight"; the distinction did not prevent her from fully concurring in the majority
opinion that the trial court, and therefore the appellate court, was precluded from
consideration of the merits of an untimely motion for acquittal. See id.
13

the trial result, is consistent with the course the defendant has previously chosen, that is,
the defendant is presenting additional reasons why the verdict should not stand. And
while a timely motion to withdraw is a legal pre-requisite to an appeal, a timely motion
for new trial merely suspends the finality of the judgment and, thereby, tolls the time for
filing an appeal from the trial itself. See UTAH R. APP. P. 4(b); Burgers v. Maiben, 652
P.2d 1320, 1321-22 (Utah 1982). Moreover, while the right to file a motion to withdraw
is statutorily controlled, a motion for new trial is regulated only by rule. Compare UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 77-13-6, with UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(b). For these reasons, even though a

superficial similarity exists between the two motions, their procedural and substantive
differences are fundamental.14
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Davis v. Grand County Service Area, 905 P.2d 888 (Utah App. 1995) (Def. Br.
at 16 & 23) is also factually distinguishable. In Davis, a civil plaintiff filed a timely
motion for new trial following an adverse verdict. Id. at 890-91. When the motion was
denied, Davis filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied; Davis then timely
appealed. Id. The court of appeals concluded that while the issues raised in the first
motion for new trial were preserved, Davis did not brief these issues on appeal. Id. at
891. Instead, Davis chose to brief the issues raised in his motion for reconsideration. The
court of appeals considered the motion for reconsideration to be an untimely second
motion for new trial, which the trial court "lacked jurisdiction" to consider. Id.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals considered the unpreserved issues under "plain error."
Id. While the court of appeals used the term "jurisdiction," the issue is one of
preservation. A timely appeal from the denial of a timely motion for new trial was
properly before the court; as such, the appellate court could properly use its discretion to
reach additional unpreserved grounds. See State Br. at 13-16. Here, the situation is
opposite: by failing to timely file a motion to withdraw, defendant has failed to meet the
legal pre-requisite for an appeal of the merits. See discussion, supra at 7-8. See also
Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995 (failure to comply with section 77-13-6fs time restriction
extinguishes defendant's substantive right to directly challenge his guilty plea).
14

Despite defendant's claims to the contrary, see Def Br. at 24-25, section 77-13-6's
legislatively-mandated restrictions are reasonable. A defendant who pleads guilty is
agreeing to a final settlement and termination of the prosecution. His right to thereafter
challenge his decision is necessarily limited. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8) (recognizing
limited nature of review). See also Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1067; Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995;
Price, 837 P.2d at 583. Even so, if he fails to timely file a motion to withdraw, he still
has a remedy: he may seek collateral review. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(c). While
defendant complains that collateral review precludes examination of non-constitutional
errors, see Def. Br. at 24-25, the same limitation on the scope of review applies if a
defendant, convicted by jury, fails to timely file a notice of appeal and, thereafter, seeks
collateral review. See State v. Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264, 265 (Utah 1997); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-35a-104 (1996) (specifying limited grounds for post-conviction relief). See
also Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993) (in all instances, collateral
review is limited to review of constitutional error; therefore, collateral review of a guilty
plea is limited to determining if it was "voluntary and knowing," and not whether there
was compliance with rule 11).
Defendant's final argument is that if Ostler is overruled, Gibbons' strict
compliance requirements will be undermined. See Def. Br. at 25. This is not true. The
validity of defendant's pleas are not before the Court. See notes 1, 2 &4, supra at 3 & 5,
and State Br.t Addendum B.

Therefore, determination of the legal issue involved -
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whether an appellate court has jurisdiction to decide the merits of a motion to withdraw
once it concludes that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits - will not
impact this Court's previously established requirements for a valid plea. See Salazar, 852
P.2d at 991 n.6 (noting that post-conviction bar to consideration of non-constitutional
error does not undermine Gibbons-Maguire requirements). Indeed, this Court routinely
determines jurisdictional issues involving appeals of jury verdicts without implicating the
substantive requirements for criminal trials. See State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37-38
(Utah 1981) (refusing to consider untimely appeal involving alleged constitutional error).
Whether arising from a guilty plea or jury verdict, substantive constitutional error cannot
overrule or relax jurisdictional requirements. See State Br. at 13-17. Instead, if direct
appeal is barred, the proper remedy is to seek collateral review. See State Br. at 17-18.
See Jiminez, 938 P.2d at 265; Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in the State's opening and reply briefs, this Court should
reverse Ostler and affirm the trial court's summary dismissal of defendant's untimely
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motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
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